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Geopolitics of Energy

Energy, and oil in particular, are strategic resources that have been associated with armed conflict 1. Additionally, availability of oil and other forms of energy is necessary to conduct modern warfare.

Military Energy Consumption

Most energy consumption by the United States federal government is by the Department of Defense, most of which in turn is for military vehicles and operations. In the United States, the military is responsible for about 1% of national energy consumption.

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Sources: Department of Defense 2, 3 and Department of Energy 4.

If world military energy consumption, per dollar spent 5, is the same as the United States, then world annual military energy consumption is about 2 exajoules, or about 0.5% of final energy consumption 6.

The military has required much greater shares of national energy consumption during periods of major warfare.

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Historical data from Smil 7 and current data as shown above.

The logistics of warfare greatly increase the cost of supplying energy. The cost of delivering a gallon of gasoline to the battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan was estimated to range from $9 to $45 per gallon, compared to $2-3 per gallon for civilian supply 8. High cost and the vulnerability imposed by supply chains stimulate military interest in energy efficiency and onsite energy production options such as solar microgrids 8.

Problem:
Cost of War
Solution:
Maintenance of Peace

Oil Dependency

Dependency on imported natural resources, particularly oil, carries risk separately from environmental impacts. Figures are disputed and uncertain; one estimate of the externalized security and economic risks of imported oil, relative to domestic oil, is as follows.

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Security and economic risk premium of important oil, relative to domestic oil. Estimates were made in the context of marginal United States imports in 2013 and 2014, presented in 2010 dollars. The magnitude of these costs, and whether they are properly considered external costs, is debated. In particular, Hall 9 estimates a defense spending premium of $13.16 (2010 dollars). Source: Brown and Kennelly 10.

Natural Gas Dependency

Due to the fixed nature of natural gas pipeline routes, heavy usage of imported natural gas can create risk for a country. In 2009, Ukraine and most Western European countries had natural gas supplies cut off following a dispute with Russia, the main supplier 11. Europe is less vulnerable to gas cut-off now but remain vulnerable; diversification of supply is a key to reducing vulnerability 12.

Problem:
Vulnerability to Gas Disruptions
Solution:
Europe Should Maintain Nuclear Fleet

In the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, natural gas dependency was a factor behind both the delayed Western European reaction and in financing the Russian war effort 13.

Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, and the ability to make them, to countries or non-state actors not presently in possession of such abilities. Nuclear power poses a proliferation risk because there is some overlap, such as uranium enrichment 14, between the technologies for power and for weapons.

Experts are divided on the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation that may result from nuclear power. It is difficult, though not impossible, to repurpose civilian enrichment facilities for weapons production 15. Historically, states with civilian nuclear programs have not been more likely to develop weapons than those without 16.

Proliferation is more likely to occur in states with weak or non-democratic governance, corruption, or regulatory ineffectiveness 14.

Experts disagree on the level of risk posed by proliferation itself. If opposing parties possess nuclear weapons, it may increase the deadliness but decrease the likelihood of conflict 17.

Materials in 100% Renewable Scenario

A 100% renewable future, with electric vehicles, will require a dramatic increase in certain materials.

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Source: Giurco 18.

The Rare Earth metals are of additional concern. The Rare Earths consist of Scandium, Yttrium, and the 15 Lanthanide chemical elements: Cerium, Dysprosium, Erbium, Europium, Gadolinium, Holmium, Lanthanum, Lutetium, Neodymium, Praseodymium, Promethium, Samarium, Terbium, Thulium, and Ytterbium. There are over 500 years of production of such elements, with the majority in China.

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Source: USGS 19.

Two elements in particular, dysprosium and neodymium, are of concern due to possible supply shortages and their use in permanent magnets for wind turbines 20.

For a high renewable and EV future, it will be necessary to open new lithium, cobalt, dysprosium, and neodymium mines 18, 20. Despite the need for new mining and current Chinese dominance over Rare Earth production, there are unlikely to be geopolitical conflicts over these elements if production is expanded 21, 22.

Minerals for clean energy tend to be more concentrated than fossil fuels.

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Source: IEA 23.

Hydroelectricity

Most energy sources pose the risk of conflict due to siting and material extraction demands, but hydropower can be particularly fraught. There is currently risk of war between Ethiopia and Egypt and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 24, and hydropower has been linked to conflict in Colombia 25, Brazil 26, Myanmar 27, and other places.

Due to land use conflict, hydropower is not likely to reach its economic or technical potential.

References

  1. Månsson, A. "Energy, conflict and war: Towards a conceptual framework". Energy Research & Social Science 4, pp. 106-116. 2014. ↩

  2. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment. "Department of Defense Annual Energy Management and Resilience Report (AEMRR): Fiscal Year 2018". United States Department of Defense. September 2019. ↩

  3. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. "Fiscal Year 2018 Operational Energy Annual Report". United States Department of Defense. May 2019. ↩

  4. Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. "Comprehensive Annual Energy Data and Sustainability Performance". United States Department of Energy. Accessed May 1, 2020. ↩

  5. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database". Accessed April 15, 2020. ↩

  6. International Energy Agency. "Sankey Diagram". Accessed April 18, 2019. ↩

  7. Smil, V. "War and Energy". In: Encyclopedia of Energy, C. Cleveland, ed., Vol. 6, Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 363-371. 2004. ↩

  8. Samaras, C., Nuttall, W., Bazilian, M. "Energy and the military: Convergence of security, economic, and environmental decision-making". Energy Strategy Reviews 26, 100409. November 2019. ↩ ↩2

  9. Hall, D. "Oil and National Security". Energy Policy 20(11), pp. 1089‐1096. November 1992. ↩

  10. Brown, S., Kennelly, R. "Consequences of U.S. Dependence on Foreign Oil". National Energy Policy Institute. April 2013. ↩

  11. Khrennikova, D., Shiryaevskaya, A., Krasnolutska, D. "Why the Russia-Ukraine Gas Dispute Worries Europe". The Washington Post. December 2019. ↩

  12. Stern, J., Yafimava, K., Rogers, H., Pirani, S., El-Katiri, L., Honoré, A., Henderson, J., Hassanzadeh, E., Dickel, R. "Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas – distinguishing natural gas security from geopolitics". The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, paper NG92. October 2014. ↩

  13. McBride, J. "Russia’s Energy Role in Europe: What’s at Stake With the Ukraine Crisis". Council on Foreign Relations. February 2022. ↩

  14. Miller, S., Sagan, S. "Nuclear power without nuclear proliferation?". Daedalus 138(4), pp. 7-18. Fall 2009. ↩ ↩2

  15. Squassoni, S. "Proliferation risks from nuclear power infrastructure". AIP Conference Proceedings 1898, 040005. November 2017. ↩

  16. Miller, N. "Why Nuclear Energy Programs Rarely Lead to Proliferation". International Security 42(2), pp. 40-77. November 2017. ↩

  17. Rauchhaus, R. "Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach". Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(2), pp. 258-277. January 2009. ↩

  18. Giurco, D., Dominish, E., Florin, N., Watari, T., McLellan, B. "Requirements for Minerals and Metals for 100% Renewable Scenarios". Achieving the Paris Climate Agreement Goals, pp. 437-457. ISBN : 978-3-030-05842-5. February 2019. ↩ ↩2

  19. United States Geological Survey. "Rare Earths". January 2020. ↩

  20. Habib, K., Wenzel, H. "Exploring rare earths supply constraints for the emerging clean energy technologies and the role of recycling". Journal of Cleaner Production 84, pp. 348-359. December 2014. ↩ ↩2

  21. Månberger, A., Johansson, B. "The geopolitics of metals and metalloids used for the renewable energy transition". Energy Strategy Reviews 26, # 100394. November 2019. ↩

  22. Overland, I. "The geopolitics of renewable energy: Debunking four emerging myths". Energy Research & Social Science 49, pp. 36-40. March 2019. ↩

  23. International Energy Agency. "The Role of Critical World Energy Outlook Special Report Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions". May 2021. ↩

  24. Mbaku, J. "The controversy over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam". The Brookings Institution, Africa in Focus. August 2020. ↩

  25. Martínez, V., Castillo, O. "The political ecology of hydropower: Social justice and conflict in Colombian hydroelectricity development". Energy Research & Social Science 22, pp. 69-78. December 2016. ↩

  26. Pase, H., Da Rocha, H., Dos Santos, E., Patella, A. "The Sociopolitical Conflict in Hydroelectric Enterprises". Ambiente & Sociedade 19(2), São Paulo. April/June 2016. ↩

  27. Middleton, C., Scott, A., Lamb, V. "Hydropower Politics and Conflict on the Salween River". Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River, pp. 27-48. Part of the The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science book series (APESS, volume 27). August 2019. ↩