There are several ways in which energy is over- or under-priced.
Greenhouse gas emissions, primarily from energy, have harmful impacts on the future climate that are generally externalized from the emitter. Imposing a tax at the point of emission internalizes those costs. Following are select estimates of damages.
Major damages in climate economic modeling include rising sea level, severe weather, wider range of tropical disease, direct impact of heat, and increased cooling costs. Models generally take into account the benefits of lower heating costs and CO2 fertilization of crops 8. Most countries will be harmed by climate change, with India hit particularly hard, though Russia, Canada, and Scandinavian countries could benefit 5.
Throughout much of Urban Cruise Ship, we have used a social cost of carbon of $50/ton CO2e, which translates to 45 ¢/gallon for gasoline 9. More recent estimates suggest that a higher price may be appropriate. Based on a weighted median of nearly 6,000 estimates of the social costs of carbon collected by Richard Tol 10, with more recent estimates given higher weights, we estimate that a cost of $141.40 per ton (2024 dollars) is appropriate. We have used this figure in more recent work.
Döbbeling-Hildebrandt et al. (2024) 11 perform a meta-review on carbon pricing policies and found that the ones that had been implemented, despite low prices, had reduced emissions by 4% to 15% after correcting for publication bias. Gugler, Haxhimusa, and Liebensteiner 12 find that in addressing greenhouse gas emissions in the power sector, Britain's carbon tax was far more effective than Germany's subsidizing of solar and wind. Boyce (2018) 13 finds that carbon pricing is effective, but there is a risk of regressive distributional impacts. This problem can be mitigated with carbon dividends to the general public. However, the meta-review of Green (2021) 14 finds a modest role for the effect of carbon pricing.
Estimating the degree to which carbon pricing reduces emissions is difficult. For Resources for the Future, Rafaty, Dolphin, and Pretis (2021) 15 find that the introduction of a carbon price, at any level, reduces emissions growth by 1-2% per year, while every dollar of the level of the price reduces emissions growth by 0.03% per year. They conclude that a carbon price is an important solution to reducing emissions but not sufficient on its own. For the OECD, D’Arcangelo et al. (2022) 16 find that a 10 Euro ($11) carbon price results in a 3.7% reduction in fossil fuel emissions.
The World Bank finds that, as of 2023, there were 75 carbon pricing policies in effect worldwide at national and subnational levels 17. Of these, 39 were carbon taxes and 36 were emission trading schemes, both of which were in many cases accompanied by carbon offsets. As of April 2024, pricing policies covered 24% of world greenhouse gas emissions, raising an annualized $104 billion of revenue. In 2024 dollars, a price of $63-127 per ton was identified as necessary to meet the Paris Agreement's goal of limiting global warming temperature rise to 2°C and a price of $226-385/ton was identified as necessary to meet the 1.5°C temperature rise goal. Of 75 carbon pricing mechanisms, only 7, covering less than 1% of world emissions, had a price of at least $63/ton as of 2023.
A carbon price typically imposes near-term economic costs with long-term climate benefits and more immediate health benefits by reducing other forms of pollution. Recent modeling has found the following costs, climate benefits, and health benefits from recent carbon pricing proposals in the United States Congress.
The International Monetary Fund has released several reports detailing direct energy subsidies and unpriced externalities, both of which they consider to be "subsidies". The 2023 values are as follows 27.
The IMF assesses subsidies and unpriced externalities by type. Unpriced externalities, or implicit subsidies, are assessed by four major categories: local air pollution, climate change, externalities from road use that is enabled by petroleum fuels, and forgone government tax revenues. Explicit subsidies are further divided into subsidies for consumers, such as subsidized gasoline and heating oil, and subsidies for producers. While we believe that road externalities should be internalized, such as through congestion pricing, it is debatable whether they should be termed energy subsidies since they apply regardless of how a car is powered.
In our deployment section, we note that technology deployment has social value via the learning-by-doing effect. We estimate the learning-by-doing value as follows.
Not all of the value estimated here is necessarily an appropriate subsidy, as the developer of the energy system will capture some of the learning benefits.
Sometimes it is too expensive or infeasible to reduce onsite emissions, and in that case one may purchase carbon offsets to reduce emissions elsewhere. Such purchases may be done voluntarily or to comply with a cap-and-trade law. Over 2023, the average carbon offset price was $6.53 per ton CO2e removed 16.
Among certified offsets, forestry and land use projects are currently the most popular.
Carbon offsets have been criticized for failing to deliver the promised emissions reductions 29, 30, 31, 32, 33. An estimated 85% of forestry projects under the Clean Development Mechanism, one of the main certifications of carbon offsets, are estimated to overstate emissions reductions 34, and in 2023, Carbon Direct estimated that fewer than 10% of asssessed projects meet their standards for high quality 35. However, offsets in California have been observed to reduce emissions 36.
It may be the case that many of Clean Development Mechanism's wind power projects would have been built without the offsets, and thus they do not reduce emissions, a problem known as additionality 37, 38. Independently, it is estimated that 37% of REDD+ projects (deforestation and land use projects) and 24% of ARR (Afforestation, Reforestation and Revegetation) projects overlap areas that are already protected, a problem known as double-counting 39, 38. Carbon offsets have also been criticized for obstructing deep decarbonization of sectors such as transportation 40. Additional problems with offset effectiveness are leakage--the tendency for emissions reductions in one place to result in increased emissions elsewhere--and permanance, or uncertainty over how long carbon will be sequestered 38.
In California, regional averages have been used to estimate sequestration capacities, but landowners are then able to select land areas that have lower-than-average sequestration; over-crediting in this manner has been estimated at 29% of claimed reductions 38.
At prices below $50/ton, a low estimate of the social cost of carbon, an estimated 3-13 billion tons per year of carbon offsets may be available 41. This contrasts to world emissions of about 40 billion tons annually.
Following growing concern about the problems with carbon offsets as described above, the market lost about 60% of its traded value from 2021 to 2023 42. As of 2023, 3.2 billion tons of non-retired CO2-equivalent have been issued through voluntary carbon markets, equivalent to about 7% of a single year's worldwide emissions 42.
A Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) is similar in concept to a carbon offset, in that one REC represents a megawatt-hour of renewable energy generation. Typically, when corporations such as Google or Apple announce that they run on "100% renewable energy", it means that they purchased enough RECs to cover their full usage portfolio 43.
RECs are useful to renewable energy generators in that they represent an additional revenue stream. However, the price of RECs has fallen to 97 ¢/MWh in the West to $64/MWh in the Northeast, in most the country too low a price to meaningfully incentivize new renewable energy generation 44.
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