Animal welfare is another tradition in environmental ethics, alongside preservation of ecosystems.
There is no consensus on whether and how non-human animals merit moral consideration. In a thorough review on the ethics of animal welfare, Luke Muehlhauser assesses that the probability that animals possess a kind of consciousness that merits moral consideration is 25% for common fruit flies and 80% for chickens, but he acknowledges great uncertainty in these assessments 1. These probabilities are based on the presence of over 40 indicators of consciousness, some of which are observed in entities that are not widely regarded as conscious.
Though many indicators of consciousness are uncertain or lacking in many animals, nociception, or the capacity to experience pain, is common throughout the animal kingdom, as observed from animal behavior 2.
Immanuel Kant and many early advocates on Kantian ethics took the view that non-human animals do not possess intrinsic moral standing, but rather they have indirect moral standing that merit protection 3. Against this view, Christine Korsgaard argues from a Kantian perspective that animals possess direct moral standing 4.
Contractarianism is the view that moral standing is afforded to rational beings that are capable of assenting to a social contract. Such a view would seem to pose an especial problem to the concept of animal rights, but Rowland 5 argues that moral obligations to animals can be derived from contractarianism.
Tom Regan and Peter Singer call for recognition of animal rights based on their cognitive capacities 6, and Gary Francione argues that any concept of animal rights must rest on an abolitionist position: the right of animals not to be owned 7. Against this view, Carl Cohen argues that an animal rights position fails because of the inability for non-human animals to comprehend duty 8, while R. G. Frey argues that due to a lack of language, nonhuman animals have the inability to hold beliefs and thus to have interests 9.
Taking a capabilities approach to welfare, Martha Nussbaum argues that a just society requires that its members are granted those things that are required for flourishing, which for nonhuman animals would at least entail freedom from suffering 10.
Thus, most mainstream systems of ethics at least allow for the principle of ethical obligations to conscious animals.
Under theories of sentiocentrism, it is the capacity to think and feel pain that confers moral standing on an organism. It is reasonable to suppose that not all conscious animals carry the same moral weight. Bob Fischer of Rethink Priorities' Moral Weight Project 11, as summarized by 80,000 Hours 2, finds for instance that a black solider fly should have about 1% of the moral weight of a human, and a pig should have about 50% of the moral weight of a human.
Under some models of gradual sentriocentrism, the weighting might be crudely estimated by the number of neurons an organism has in its central nervous system.
Brain size, body size, and observed intelligence are roughly correlated, but there are significant outliers; for example, birds tend to have highly packed brains and are intelligent for their size 34. Some species of whale and dolphin also show larger brains than humans 32.
Ethics of animal welfare have typically focused on three captive groups: animals for food production, laboratory animals, and tamed animals in zoos and other such locations. By sheer numbers, food production marks the largest figures.
Possibly much larger numbers of wild animals are affected by agriculture, pollution, and other human activities, but the figures are very difficult to quantify 35.
Predation presents a dilemma between animal welfare and some versions of environmental ethics. On the one hand, predation causes substantial suffering and distress to prey creatures, and on the other, predation is an integral aspect of the functioning of ecosystems. Several views have been advanced on the Predation Problem.
View | Advocates |
---|---|
It would be right, hypothetically, to prevent predation if it would prevent suffering, but this would actually. | Singer, Clark |
Non-human predators are not our moral agenda, predation is not a violation of animal rights, and there is no obligation to intervene. | Regan |
Interfering with predation would be a violation on nature. | Kapembwa |
We should try to reduce predation if this can be done without increasing overall suffering. | Sapontzis, Cowen |
We should reprogram predators to cease predation or sterilize them. | Pearce |
Causing extinction of carnivores would be instrumentally good if this does not cause ecological upheaval. | McMahan |
Predators should be preserved, as they are an important part of ecology. | Hargrove |
Predators are also important to conserve. | Hargrove |
Predation is a 'sad good' that should be respected, an important natural process and driver of evolution. | Rolston |
Predation can be seen as a special case of wild animal suffering, which occurs also due to hunger, thirst, disease, and other factors. Due to evolutionary factors, which do not value the well-being of particular organisms, this suffering is extensive 47. Although it is difficult to measure precisely, evidence is that suffering dominates enjoyment in nature 48, 49. There are practical measures that have been taken to reduce wildlife suffering, such as wildlife vaccination 50.
The ethics of raising and eating animals for food are complicated. Though there are many viewpoints on the subject, the following are most common.
Position | Explanation |
---|---|
Veganism | Avoid all animal products |
Vegetarianism | Avoid all meat, not necessarily non-meat animal products like eggs or milk |
Animal Welfarists | Not necessarily any dietary restriction, concearned about animal welfare |
Meat Eaters | No restriction |
Following are estimates of the number of farm animals that are killed for dietary needs.
Also see our analysis of meat and animal products for more information on this topic.
Zoos and aquariums are controversial institutions, seeking justification for their (alleged) cost in animal welfare. Zoos and aquariums are often justified for their value to conservation. These institutions can educate the public, inspire greater interest in conservation, raise money, and serve conservation directly as breeding grounds for endangered animals.
Zoos have been criticized as vioating the freedom of animals to live a natural lifestyle and for diminishing their quality of life. Among people who have made this criticism, some conservationists and other experts argue that zoos may be justified on conservation grounds 53, 54, 55, while others that it is not 56, 43. Animal advocates who approach the subject from more of a welfare view, rather than a rights view, are more likely to be open to zoos 57.
Some zoos are ethically run, and some are not. Factors in an ethically run zoo include sufficient space for animals that mimics natural habitat, meeting of animals' physical needs, avoidance of animal tricks and limited animal exposure to the public, and the conduct of research or conservation activities 58. In a well-run zoo, animals tend to have longer lives and better satisfaction of physical needs than their wild counterparts, but other aspects of their well-being are hard to assess 59.
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